Compliance for Digital Assets
summary
Proposal adds enhanced viewing keys to Orchard/Orsa: each transfer includes an extra consensus-verified encrypted field containing spent and new diversified addresses plus value, keyed to an auditor-specific asset base so only that auditor can reconstruct a Bitcoin-style graph for that asset. Verification uses nullifiers, commitments and a ZK relation tying ciphertext to the new note; main open issues are choosing a quantum-secure verifiable encryption scheme, prover/proof cost, and whether to combine this proof with the existing transfer proof or isolate a compliant asset pool.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (19)
- 0:00Digital asset compliance intro
- 2:04Regulatory stance on Bitcoin
- 3:31Censorship vs compliance tools
- 5:18B2B privacy compliance needs
- 6:21Zcash enhanced viewing keys
- 8:07Orchard protocol derivation
- 10:15Verifying Orchard transactions
- 12:04Bitcoin-style graphs with keys
- 14:12Auditor asset visibility
- 16:24Key management for issuers
- 19:41Quantum encryption challenges
- 21:06Proof design open questions
- 22:29Indistinguishability and space costs
- 23:53Isolated compliant asset pools
- 24:35Q&A
- 25:38Auditor protocols edge cases
- 27:04Global compliance tech adaptability
- 28:35Auditor key leakage parallels
- 30:05Summary
related talks
50mOrchard Shielded Assets
17mZconnaissance - Sketching a Shielded Assets Future
46mCan we have privacy and compliance at the same time?
54mHalo2 circuit changes for Zcash Shielded Asset and Atomic Swaps
19mBeyond the Blacklist, The Compliant Way To Do Private Transactions
31mSecure Distributed Storage
28mThe Year Is 2030: What Does On-Chain Privacy and Compliance Look Like?
28mRings and trees: how to prove coin ownership