Verifiable Elections—Now Is the Time
summary
Claims that elections become independently auditable using end-to-end verifiable systems that publish encrypted ballots to a public ledger, use homomorphic tallying or cryptographic commitments to compute totals, and provide voters short confirmation codes from devices like Hart Verity. Deployed systems include Scantegrity, ElectionGuard, Prêt‑à‑Voter and Belenios; practical audits show that a few dozen to a few hundred random voter checks will very likely detect tampering at the 1% scale. A simple card‑trick demo illustrates voter-side verification.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (8)
- 0:00Election integrity work
- 1:46Election confidence crisis
- 3:50End-to-end verifiability
- 8:01Privacy with cryptography
- 12:15Verifiable elections in practice
- 15:47Risks of internet voting
- 17:14Cryptographic commitments
- 18:40Call for election reform
related talks
45mFrom Ballots to Code: Exploring Election Security
22mBuilding a Voting Machine Everyone Can Trust
12mIncreasing security without decreasing usability: A comparison of various verifiable...
01h 01mPrinting Votes — Is It a Hack?
48mElection Security The post pandemic acceleration of secure web based voting
01h 02mIntroduction to Election Security
35mFreeing the software that runs our elections
21mBuilding trust in a system through transparency: lessons from Swiss Post E-Voting system