Hardening Confidential Federated Computations against Side-Channel Attacks
summary
Identifies two concrete side channels against confidential federated analytics running on AMD SEV‑SNP VMs: host-observable page faults from dynamic hash tables and data-dependent ciphertext lengths for intermediate histograms. Proposes a DP-based mitigation for the page‑fault leak using an above-threshold DP resizing rule (pseudocode only) and a practical mitigation for message length via shifted truncated Laplace padding that bounds key length and group counts; the padding is implemented in the open‑source library and audited on arXiv.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Confidential federated computations
- 3:52TEEs replacing trust
- 8:08AMD SEV-SNP confidential VMs
- 13:24Hardening side-channel attacks
- 13:46Mitigating performance side channels
- 17:28Message length data leaks
- 20:40Summary and challenges
- 21:53Q&A on obliviousness
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