We Really Need to Talk About Session Tickets: A Large-Scale Analysis...
summary
Large-scale scans collect TLS session tickets from Tranco Top 100k and full IPv4 space, store tickets for offline analysis and run online modification tests, and try ~400 ticket formats against 144 keys to identify weak or misformatted tickets. Results show a critical AWS-related flaw enabling passive decryption for 1.9% of Tranco Top 100k, many zero-key and counting-key deployments, several partially uninitialized keys, one unencrypted Keystone instance, and no padding‑oracle or missing‑MAC failures.
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chapters (14)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:05TLS session tickets
- 6:23Performance vs security
- 8:52Vulnerabilities in session ticket encryption keys
- 11:20TLS implementations analysis
- 15:11Scan methodology
- 20:23Internet scan
- 22:31First scan results
- 23:34IPv4 scan findings
- 26:44Scan results summary
- 27:26TLS 1.3 fixes
- 29:08TLS 1.2 risks
- 30:36Secure design recs
- 31:20Q&A
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