Copy Pest - A Case Study On The ClipBoard, Blind Trust And Invis...
summary
Demonstrates concrete clipboard XSS: document apps create multiple clipboard “buckets” (HTML/RTF/text), attackers modify styles.xml or document.xml (rename docx to zip), edit fonts with FontForge modified preferred family name, or hex‑edit PDFs to inject payloads; uses entity‑encoded SVG animate and VBS/backtick tricks to bypass sanitizers in Chrome and Firefox and achieve script/iframe execution; builds a working proof: a Flash‑in‑PDF clipboard swap that replaces clipboard after copy. Works across ODT/DOC/DOCX/PDF/XPS/Office 2013/365/LibreOffice and common browsers. Defense: paste‑as‑plain (Ctrl‑Shift‑V) or robust whitelist sanitization.
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