Accountable authentication with privacy protection: The Larch system for universal login
summary
Larch splits each authentication secret between client and a log server so an attacker who compromises a device cannot authenticate without producing an encrypted log record, and the log cannot learn which relying party was used. It works with unmodified FIDO2, TOTP and password logins and prevents the log from authenticating for users or linking accounts. Implementation uses two-party computation and a threshold ECDSA precomputation trick; measured latencies are 150ms (FIDO2), 91ms (TOTP, 1.23s preprocessing), and 74ms (passwords).
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chapters (7)
- 0:00The problem of SSO
- 1:31Introduction to Lark
- 2:17Lark design principles
- 4:27The Lark protocol
- 6:53Protocol optimization
- 9:57Evaluation and results
- 11:55Conclusion
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