Trying to De-Anonymize I2P Network Participants
summary
Analysis models a tunnel takeover against the i2pd client, combining Sybil and intersection techniques and requiring control of an inbound gateway plus a last-hop router; no packet injection is used. A mathematical model and graphs quantify success probability, showing default 2–3 hops and 10-minute renewal materially reduce success, while targeted DDoS to force tunnel churn raises it. Tests remain theoretical (attack-simulation network unfinished); conclusion: I2P resists common attacks but high-effort de-anonymization remains possible.
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chapters (7)
- 0:00Introduction to diva.exchange
- 2:12Technology stack and vision
- 8:53I2P research overview
- 17:31Tunnel takeover attacks
- 23:37Mitigation and analysis
- 30:02Conclusion of research
- 32:51Outro and contact
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