Layered Attestation of a Cross-Domain System
Talkat Linux Security Summit North America 2025 · on Friday, 2025-06-27· at 14:30· Bluebird Ballroom (BBB) 3GH·
summary
A full boot-to-runtime attestation system is built using TPM 2.0 for a sealed attestation-manager signing key, IMA and SELinux measurements via Elkim, and a formally verified Maestro attestation manager that runs a Copland attestation protocol; the key is sealed to PCRs 4, 8, 9 and 11 so signatures tightly bind evidence to a correctly booted stack. MITRE CHASE generates attack cases, tests detect the expected tamperings, and engineering the key protection takes six months instead of the planned month, so long-term testing and patch/patching handling remain unfinished.
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chapters (6)
- 0:00Introduction
- 13:50Layered attestation architecture
- 29:58Runtime attestation cross-domain
- 35:58Empirical testing adversary analysis
- 41:20Lessons learned future directions
- 58:00Q&A
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