State of the secure software supply chain
summary
SolarWinds supply chain compromise motivates concrete defenses: ingest dependencies with SBoMs (SPDX or CycloneDX), scan them, and copy into a local registry; attest build steps with in-toto and short‑lived node identity via spiffy/spire or TPMs (keylime), then sign with HSM-backed APIs (parsec or Vault/transit) and publish signatures alongside images (cosign + rekor / notary v2 + OCI reference types). Reproducible builds and admission controllers (OPA Gatekeeper) close rollback, replay, and dependency‑confusion gaps.
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chapters (12)
- 0:00Introduction
- 0:46Recap
- 1:21Supply chain attacks
- 2:31dependency confusion attacks
- 6:45harden your environment
- 9:35software build materials
- 12:35attestation
- 15:04signing
- 17:53trust
- 22:38related projects
- 24:56reproducible builds
- 27:51wrap up
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