The Misuse Of Secure Components In Hardware Wallets
summary
Full hardware audit of a OneKey wallet shows concrete, unfixable failures: the pairing key ends up stored in STM32 OTP and is extracted via a homemade EMFI on STM32 OTP bench; PIN checking is misconfigured so that knowing that single pairing key lets an attacker read the 24‑word seed; the same pairing key is provisioned in ATECC608 and is vulnerable to laser fault injection (LFI on ATECC608); early devices all share the same key due to RNG use before locking, so deployed units are immediately exploitable.
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chapters (15)
- 0:00Intro
- 1:09CONTEXT OF EVALUATION
- 3:30HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE
- 6:21PROTECTION LEVELS
- 18:08ATECCX MCU - INITIALIZATION PHASE
- 20:51DIFFERENCES BETWEEN TWO WALLETS
- 23:50ATECC-PASSWORD CHECKING FEATURE
- 25:18FAULT INJECTION-SETUP
- 26:18FAULT INJECTION-ATECC CONFIGURATION
- 27:27READ PROTECTED SLOT 6-NORMAL EXECUTION
- 28:34READ PROTECTED SLOT 6-FORBIDDEN READ
- 31:003 READ ENCRYPTED SLOT 6-CONSUMPTION CURVES
- 31:56READ PROTECTED SLOT 6-OBSERVED BEHAVIORS
- 34:07READ PROTECTED SLOT 6-REVISIONS COMPARISON
- 40:19READ PROTECTED SLOT 6-CONSUMPTION CURVES
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