Networks and Economics 1
Talkat Graph Limits and Processes on Networks: From Epidemics to Misinformation Boot Camp · 2022-08-29..09-02
summary
Presents concrete results and tools: threshold coordination games produce multiple equilibria that form a complete lattice; best‑shot public goods equilibria equal maximal independent sets and are NP‑hard to enumerate; a linear‑quadratic model yields closed‑form actions proportional to Katz–Bonacich centrality (solution requires B/C below the spectral bound); on stochastic block models equilibria concentrate on blocks under weak homophily; empirical fit on Add Health gives a 40% threshold best fit and mispredicts ~30% of nodes.
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chapters (21)
- 0:00Start
- 2:13Pure Effects
- 6:27Nash Equilibrium
- 16:44Strategic Complements and Substitutes
- 18:41Equilibrium Structure
- 18:58Strategic Substitutes Strategic Complements
- 22:10Negative Externality
- 24:54Congestion Games
- 25:32Complementarities and Strategic Substitutes
- 28:30Vaccinations
- 30:27Partial Orderings
- 34:20Equilibrium Existence and Structure
- 40:18Pure Strategy Equilibrium
- 43:01Community Detection
- 46:09Simple Contagion
- 48:17Stochastic Block Models
- 48:34Theorem on Stochastic Block Models
- 51:20Homophily
- 1:15:31Linear Quadratic Models
- 1:21:13Page Rank
- 1:24:39Structural Modeling
