On the Shoulders of Giants: Security in FOSS
summary
Panel argues supply‑chain risk by naming concrete failures like Log4Shell, cites tooling such as SBOM generation and dependency graphs, and calls for repository metadata to automate vulnerability contact details. Describes a maintenance + bug bounty pipeline called the bug resilience program that gates bounties on posture improvements. Gives deployments: contact‑tracing stack in 54 health centres serving ~30 million people as an architecture lesson, and cites David Wheeler’s bug rate (bugs per KLOC per year) to justify ongoing funding.
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chapters (12)
- 0:00Introduction and context
- 1:30Planning security conference
- 2:56Supply chain security challenges
- 4:40Log4j vulnerability impact
- 6:06Automating security communication
- 8:59Preventing security incidents
- 11:47Bug bounty program approach
- 13:31Legal barriers in reporting
- 15:40Public health infrastructure lessons
- 17:24Architecture as security issue
- 18:53Funding open source security
- 20:21Call for contributions
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