How to Fight the Lazarus Group
summary
Panel describes how North Korea’s Lazarus Group used Tornado Cash and other rails to move 1.4 billion in the Biyt/Bybit theft, traces funds with forensic firms like Zero Shadow, and coordinates response through SEAL’s Telegram bot hotlines and industry law‑enforcement channels; fixes often work if a centralized service (Tether/Circle) can freeze a wallet quickly but are hampered by phishing‑first intrusions, fewer than a dozen FBI agents on many cases, and lack of a zero knowledge share data pipeline and crypto‑native certification.
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chapters (13)
- 0:00Introduction and Prelude
- 0:13Last Year's Event and Research Discussion
- 1:08Tornado Cash and National Security
- 2:20Panelist Introductions
- 2:46Casey Golden's Work and Insights
- 4:47Mike Moer's Background and Perspective
- 7:59Sam's Introduction and SEAL's Mission
- 9:42Real-Life Examples and Information Sharing
- 13:14Challenges in Information Sharing
- 18:37Alignment Between Crypto Industry and Government
- 25:16Future Directions for SEAL
- 27:02Policy Recommendations and Final Thoughts
- 35:03Audience Q&A
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