An Analysis of Micro and Macro Cyber Attacks in the Ongoing War in Yemen
summary
Yemen net controls most national routing and after seizing Sana routes traffic and censors via Netsweeper while Aden/Adennet routes out through Saudi pipes. Observed metrics include 20–50 Gbps outbound, 973 Coinhive hosts concentrated in Sana and a roughly 25% rate of home routers with DNS tunneling. Multiple fiber cuts and submarine landing point risk cause 80% outages at times. Evidence shows Mikrotik routers with firmware backdoors, Tor and OpenVPN traffic for circumvention, and a small Aden ISP that bypasses Houthi control.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Start
- 0:08Geopolitical Overview
- 1:29Demographics
- 4:23Treaties of Convenience
- 9:26Submarine Landing Points
- 13:24Why Is China Interested in Yemen
- 19:46Adware and Spyware
- 21:29North Korea
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